How does the nineteenth party congress lead the development of Chinese society and diplomatic policy and do all the goals achieved? Will be any differences between the upcoming twentieth party congress?<\/p>\n
Literature Review<\/p>\n
In October 2017, the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) held its 19th Party Congress, and all signs pointed to the fact that the CPC’s grip on power would not be challenged in the foreseeable future. The conclusion of the Party Congress, which took place not too long ago, accomplished little more than reinforcing the power of China’s governing elites under the direction of Xi Jinping. Congresses of the CPC are carefully orchestrated gatherings that often do not serve as settings for the making of important decisions (Swaine, 2018). Instead, Fewsmith (2018) and Lee (2020) sees them as just the Party asserting control over previously raised problems.\u00a0The majority of the 19th Party Conference’s significant policy decisions, such as those regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) higher defense organization changes, had already been made in the five years leading up to the congress (Ruan et al., 2021). During the leadership transition that occurs every ten years and the Party Congress that occurs twice every ten years, it is essential to take stock rather than produce new ideas or initiatives. This is because taking stock is more important than generating new ideas or initiatives, according to Economy (2018).\u00a0In a lot of respects, the 19th Party Congress was comparable to others that came before it (Fewsmith, 2018). It stood out from other things in a variety of ways for example the CPC particular style of leadership that included talking about what had been accomplished in the previous five years and what was planned for the future, as well as insisting on adhering to the Party line and handing over responsibility to a new Central Committee (Gong & Xu, 2021). This was a part of the CPC’s leadership style that has been effective in the development of the Chinese society and diplomatic policy.<\/p>\n
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CPC has been the entity with the most clout in decision-making. It is in charge of giving both direction and leadership to the State Council (Dong, 2022), which is in charge of running the country (Ni, 2022). Regimes may continue in power for as long as they can convince their voters that the political institutions they now have are the best alternative and that any other option will result in chaos, instability, and unpredictability (Fewsmith, 2018). No other institution can serve as a model for how the CPC responds to and regulates changing economic realities, Chinese people’s wishes, and the larger social milieu. A number of researchers and analysts have discovered evidence to support this theory, including Lee (2020) who offer that when it comes to the CPC’s ability to adapt and sustain its power, the most important topics to address are norm-determined succession politics and the use of meritocracy rather than party membership preference as a way of developing political elites. The CPC must have both of these attributes in order to sustain its current level of success.<\/p>\n
Even in the ongoing 20th Party Congress, President Xi plans to adopt a tougher line against corruption and dissent, clamping down hard on human rights activists, lawyers, religious organizations, and the media. Furthermore, President\u00a0Xi has shown a greater inclination to clamp down on criticism rather than corruption. Throughout his first tenure as president, he also addressed the “Chinese Dream,” a nationalistic cry for China to regain its might, as well as the region’s escalating military aggression (South China Morning Post, 2022). During his term, he addressed both of these issues. Despite the fact that China and the rest of the globe are struggling with several issues, such as a bad economy and rising tensions with the US (Lee, 2020), observers believe that the fact that the party congress will be held in October demonstrates that President Xi retains significant authority inside the party (Swaine, 2018). Despite the fact that the party congress will be convened in October, this is the situation.<\/p>\n
The CPC operates from a point where it is not required to follow restrictions such as the constitution or the law. This position has not only been evident in the 19th Party Congress but also expected to extend into the 20th Party Congress. The party functions differently from Western political parties, which are often controlled by legislative or constitutional frameworks. To put it another way, the CPC does not see itself as a legally obligated party. Instead, it regards itself as the organization in charge of writing and enforcing the law. This viewpoint has been raised multiple times and given great weight during President\u00a0Xi Jinping’s term. This is expected to remain unchanged between the nineteenth- and twentieth-Party Congresses. The change Xi made to the state constitution to make the president’s term limitless set a wide precedent for amendments to the few substantive components of the party constitution, and will determine how China and the society operate and accomplish goals in the near future.<\/p>\n
References<\/p>\n
Dong, G. (2022). The political background of a pattern transformation in the Chinese system of science and technology during the 20th century.\u00a0Cultures of Science,\u00a05(1), 16-32.<\/p>\n
Economy, E. C. (2018). China’s new revolution: The reign of Xi Jinping.\u00a0Foreign Affairs,\u00a097(3), 60-74.<\/p>\n
Fewsmith, J. (2018). The 19th Party Congress: ringing in Xi Jinping\u2019s new age.\u00a0China Leadership Monitor,\u00a055, 1-22.<\/p>\n
Gong, W., & Xu, C. (2021). On Xi Jinping’s Thought of Party Style Construction.\u00a0Journal of Frontiers of Society, Science and Technology,\u00a01(4), 35-39.<\/p>\n
Lee, W. C. (2020). Multiple Shades of China\u2019s Taiwan Policy after the 19th Party Congress.\u00a0Journal of Asian and African Studies,\u00a055(2), 201-220.<\/p>\n
Ni, V. (August 19, 2022). China Communist party\u2019s 20th national congress explained \u2013 in 30 seconds: Xi Jinping is expected to secure a third term as leader at the CCP\u2019s conference later this year. The Guardian. Available at https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2022\/aug\/19\/china-communist-party-ccp-national-congress-xi-jinping-delegates-explained-in-30-seconds <\/p>\n
Ruan, L., Crete-Nishihata, M., Knockel, J., Xiong, R., & Dalek, J. (2021). The intermingling of state and private companies: analysing censorship of the 19th national Communist Party Congress on WeChat.\u00a0The China Quarterly,\u00a0246, 497-526.<\/p>\n
South China Morning Post. (September 10, 2022). 20th Party Congress: Decoding China\u2019s Leadership Reshuffle. Available at https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/20th-party-congressSwaine, M. D. (2018). Chinese views of foreign policy in the 19th party congress.\u00a0China Leadership Monitor,\u00a055(23), 1-13.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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