Death of Osama Bin Laden Effect on Al-Qaeda

 

 

 

 

Death of Osama Bin Laden: Effect on Al-Qaeda

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Death of Osama bin Laden: Effect on Al-Qaeda

International security is a challenging administrative task for governments because of the discrete nature in which terrorism networks run their terror activities. Terrorism is a post 9/11 security threat that affects all nations (Kepel & Milelli, 2008). Even advanced technology-based security equipment lack mechanisms to check radical activities since terror groups use discreet warfare techniques. The western world correlated the death of Osama bin Laden with the end of violent extremity associated with his Al-Qaeda network. However, the US-led invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan to flush out terrorists opened the Osama network. This is true since the attack failed to eliminate the core leadership of Al-Qaeda. The United States believed to have destabilized the Al-Qaeda network through the death of Osama, but the new network’s face reveals otherwise. Al-Qaeda’s leadership structure was decentralized to hide from security systems following Osama’s death, but the network has expanded into different political territories from its invincible state to launch terror attacks worldwide.

Foundation of Al-Qaeda

Osama founded Al-Qaeda in 1988, in Saudi (Kepel & Milelli, 2008). The network took advantage of the failed state of Somalia to established discreet training grounds from the early 1990s. In 1993, during the Battle of Mogadishu, Al-Qaeda killed American troops (Zimmerman, 2013). However, the network remained underground until 1996 when Osama declared war on the United States for supporting Israel’s aggressive occupation of the Middle East. By 2001, Al-Qaeda had created a bureaucratic system of affiliated networks in Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Uzbekistan (Kepel & Milelli, 2008). Al-Qaeda’s leadership structure fell under Ayman al-Zawahiri, who decentralized the organization by forging new alliances with independent like-minded violent groups in North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. “In this respect, since 2002, Al-Qaeda has embraced a grand plan for itself that was defined as much by al-Zawahiri as bin Ladin” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2013, p. 31). Affiliates under the new leadership structure run a vast network of terrorists who are trained to thrive in destabilized political states with the intention of creating sharia states.

Al-Qaeda Today

Empirical studies assert that there is a connection linking most of the destabilized nations with Al-Qaeda activities (Ward, 2013). This explains why Osama selected the failed state of Somalia as a training ground for terror groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Political instability is a precursor for clandestine military operations, but the modern Al-Qaeda is operating in strong democracies in order to destabilize these states (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008). For instance, the Taliban switched their operations from Afghanistan to Pakistan since the Asian nation is more discreet and stable than Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, the Arab spring exposed the increased mobility and strength of the Al-Qaeda networks that rallied protests and caused violence in Egypt, Mali, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria (Joscelyn, 2013). Mobility of terrorism groups has become easier because of the consistent chain of destabilized states stretching from Asia, through the Arab to Africa. The most afflicted states include: Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Mali (Rosenberg & Coker, 2010). Failed states create a readily accessible pool of Al-Qaeda terrorists that support international insurgency operations, which threaten international security.

The goal of terror organizations is to replace democracies with sharia laws. This happened in Egypt, whereby after the protests, the people were offered two Islamic choices to choose from as leader (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008). However, when the winning group tried to carry out sharia law, mass protests erupted again, and the Egyptian military ousted the triumphant government (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008). The appointment of Nasir al Wuhayshi as the general manager by Ayman al Zawahiri streamlined terrorism in North Africa and Arab states (Rosenberg & Coker, 2010). New appointments increased militant operations of Al-Qaeda in Syria, Egypt, and Libya. Rebellion offers the Al-Qaeda an easy access to build secret networks that train terrorism activities intended to set up sharia states.

In conclusion, terrorism is thriving under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who replaced Osama. The new leader decentralized Al-Qaeda, and he productively established independent training branches across many destabilized states. The readily available pool of trained terrorists ready to join the Al-Qaeda organization threatens international security. The insurgency network has successfully established sharia law governents in some of the Arab and North African states. Security is a collective duty for all states; however, if the consistent Al-Qaeda political activities in Syria, Egypt, and Libya remain unchecked, terrorism activities would increase in Europe and America. Finally, the death of Osama opened a new invincible opportunity for Al-Qaeda to run discreetly in destabilizing states to start sharia law.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

References

Canadian Security Intelligence Service. (2013). The future of Al-Qaeda: Results of a foresight project (Publication No. 2013-05-01). Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Security Intelligence Service Press.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M., & Jones, C. (2008). Assessing the dangers of illicit networks. Why Al-Qaeda may be less threatening than many think. Journal of International Security, 33(2), 7-44. Retrieved from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.7

Joscelyn, T. (2013, November 21). Al-Qaeda and the threat in North Africa. The Long War Journal. Retrieved from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/al_qaeda_and_the_thr_1.php

Kepel, G., & Milelli, J. (2008). Al Qaeda in its own words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rosenberg, M., & Coker, M. (2010, January 5). “Mobility helps Al-Qaeda extend reach.” The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB126255817317714101

Ward, J. (2013). Brand name terror: Al-Qaeda affiliate organizations and local instability. Stanford University. Retrieved from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/785/Ward_Jessica_

Thesis_Final.pdf

Zimmerman, K. (2013). The Al-Qaeda network: A new framework for defining the enemy. (Publication No. 2013-09-10). Washington, DC: Critical Threats Organization. Retrieved from American Enterprise Network website: http://www.aei.org/files/2013/09/10/-the-al-qaeda-network-a-new-framework-for-defining-the-enemy_133443407958.pdf