Cuban Missile

Cuban Missile

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Course

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Introduction

The effects of the crisis on the missile issues between United States of America and Russia –Cuba alliance created unprecedented division amongst nations in the world. The Cuban missile did not only create tension between the two countries but generated an extended division internationally amongst the countries allied to the three countries (Cuba, Russia and U.S.A). This is comprehensible from the model on how the communist and the capitalist nations reacted to the stand-off. The realization of the impending dangers in the neighboring country (Cuba) drove American to rethink its model on the superiority and war power as it had held before. Furthermore, the tension sent American leaders to the drawing board to actualize the best framework of tackling war threats and security.

However, Khrushchev made ​​by the U.S. administration guarantees of non-aggression on Cuba, which, despite fears Castro were met and respected to this day. After a few months of U.S. missiles in Turkey, according to Khrushchev provoked him to the placement of weapons in Cuba were also dismantled. In the end, thanks to technological advances in rocketry, there is no need to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere in general, because in a few years the Soviet Union has had enough of intercontinental missiles capable of reaching any city and military installation in the United States directly from the territory of the USSR.

Even though from the public view, the Cuban Missile Crisis looked simple-Cold War aspect, its real nature and possible consequences would have resulted in a massive destruction of the components of world’s sources of livelihood and humanity had real wars occurred. Therefore, credit goes to those who managed and eased the conflict. I can categorically say that the people of the 60s handled this crisis better than if this were to happen now because of the way the families were structured back then. In light of the insidious nature of the information about the crisis, especially in the public domain, this monograph explores various literatures to demystify the reality about the crisis: how the people responded (from individual to national level) and the shear lesson learned from the crisis.

ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS

Political changes that have occurred in the middle – the second half of the twentieth century,led to rapid geopolitical changes in the world and the formation of newworld order characterized by political, economic and ideological confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers – the U.S. and the USSR, and the real threat of military conflict, the consequences of which could be catastrophic. As we know, the first U.S. strategic concepts considered nuclear weapons as a tool of war , in particular the doctrine of ” massive retaliation” and not as a means of deterrence against a nuclear attack . Events of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 brought for the first time world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe, forcing a new look atglobal issues of life and established priorities. The lessons learned from a nuclear conflict off the coast of Cuba, became the starting point of American foreign policy revision strategies. US- Soviet confrontation during the Cold War secrecy imposed on many of the documents relating to the history of the conflict in the Caribbean. The narrowness of the range of sources did not allow a comprehensive approach to the study of this

question. End of the 1980s, was a turning point .Due to the change of foreign policy priorities , and the normalization of relations between the U.S. and the USSR been possible on the basis of the analysis of new , previously classified documents to reconsider traditional approaches to the problem of the Cuban missile crisis and a deeper analysis of events in 1962 qualitatively new stage in the study of complex and controversial conflict of the Cold War marked a 1998 The collection documents the National Security Archive

Edited by U.S. American researchers Lawrence Cheng and Peter Kornbluh. This book is a six-year project to collect and classify materials relating to the history of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the issue of settlement.The book published as official government documents , and closed presented to the public for the first time . Of particular interest are materials declassified U.S. State Department, which analyzes the results of the conflict and its impact on the future of American politics . They are represented by the following documents :

1. Secret Report of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Raymond Garthoff , entitled ” Meaning of the Soviet retreat for the future of American politics ” from October 29, 1962 The document was declassified February 10, 1988 The report , which is divided into 3 parts , contains information about the short-and long-term consequences for the Cuban Missile Crisis the U.S. and the general conclusion .

2 . Private message to the national security adviser and chairman of the Policy Planning Walt Rostow George Ball , Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs . The document is dated 15 November 1962 and is called ” Some Lessons of Cuba .” The secrecy was lifted Oct. 31, 1989 , indicating that the high value of the message for the U.S. government. In the 22 sectionsRostow recounts his vision of the lessons that can be learned from the events of October and offers them for discussion at a meeting of countries

NATO in December of the same year . Secrecy was lifted only October 31, 1989 , indicating that the high value of the message for the U.S. government. It is noteworthy that the document is shaded section 9 and its contents remain closed for researchers and nowadays. These facts give them the opportunity to identify new approaches to the study of conflict and its influence on the formation of American

foreign policy concepts .

3 . Memorandum to the president. Its author, Arthur Schlesinger , Kennedy adviser .

The document is dated 29 October 1962 and eloquently entitled ” After the death in Cuba .” Declassified October 19, 1976 Memorandum includes a preamble , which reveals the purpose of the message , and 8 points, which sets out the main findings of A.Schlesinger of the Soviet- American confrontation off the coast of Cuba.

Based on the analysis of these documents the findings of American experts, on the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 to the United States can be divided into three groups:

I. Domestic political factor.

In considering the item was revealed weakness of the U.S. leadership in the most important foreign policy decision- making and rapid response to the threat. Focused on the need for more thorough analysis of unforeseen circumstances , finding alternative ways out of conflict situations. This should help to improve information security. Emphasized the role of communications systems for effective policy planning. Especially it is necessary to conduct covert operations. In particular ,

cited the example of a lack of security services on the placement of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba and delayed transmission of information to Washington. In addition, a question was raised about the need to create a direct link between the American president and the Soviet premier to better agreed control in complex political situations.

Without losing the sight of the psychological component of the consequences of the Caribbean

crisis for the United States , a show of unity of the nation.Focused on the fact that such events do not carry a negative effect and is not considered morally.

II. Foreign factor.

Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the Soviet threat . The first question put to that pursued the Soviet Union , putting nuclear warheads in Cuba. According to U.S. experts , the motivation of the USSR was the following :

1 ) the desire to show the world , especially U.S. allies

indecision American leadership facing a real threat of war;

2) show the possibility of a nuclear first strike against the U.S.

the armed forces ;

3) create a counterweight to the U.S. and NATO bases abroad;

4) as a response to the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 ;

5) try to win concessions on the Berlin issue.

Further raised the issue of Soviet expansion in the Western Hemisphere . Americans have expressed concern that the Soviet Union increasingly penetrates the “third world.” – Cuba is the first example of the ” leap long distances ,” primarily political rather than military . As underlined by Rostow , ” is now not only the Soviet premier can travel across the ocean , but his rocket .” It was noted that in the current situation , when the Cuban government allowed to host the Soviet missiles , the United States has become increasingly difficult to maintain in Latin America ( member countries of the Organization of American States – OAS)

sufficiently high level of political and economic development . Thus attempts States to focus on solving major problems become problematic , making it difficult to further funding domestic programs of Latin American countries .

U.S. paid much attention to the possible reaction of the allies onactions of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the Caribbean is on the periphery of the interests of NATO , the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba affected not only the interests of Washington , but also jeopardized the basic NATO’s nuclear forces . There was a willingness to help allies in the conduct of the Cuban operation. Rostow announced a proposal : in the event of a serious crisis in the future U.S. president to appoint a commander of NATO. Do not lose sight of the Berlin crisis in 1961 Due to the fact that the problem of settlement was regarded as one of the possible causes of enemy action , emphasized the need to uphold a firm stand against Berlin.

III. Military factor .

This question I would like to highlight separately and consider three components :

navy and naval deployment of U.S. bases abroad , intelligence and nuclear weapons . According to a number of independent researchers , naval bases and the U.S. NATO allies Turkey and Italy , which were the “apple of discord ” in US-USSR confrontation showed seemingly need to limit their number . American experts in autumn 1962 did the opposite conclusion . They saw the need for it to increase the number of naval bases of the North Atlantic alliance abroad. It was stressed that these databases should not be nuclear-tipped missiles . Drew attention to the fact that the military force of the UnitedStates lies precisely in the superiority of the sea, and demonstrated that the navy during the quarantine off Cuba . On him, convinced Rostow , should bet in the future. Special emphasis on the important role of intelligence services in maintaining the stability of the foreign policy . A few years ago , in peacetime intelligence work was interpreted as a provocation , the events in Cuba made ​​the world differently look at its work , contributing to the prevention of violence. Control and stability – these should be the main objectives of U.S. intelligence. Interest was aroused by the fact that they were brought new tools for conducting intelligence activities over Cuban territory, allowing faster transfer intelligence. The Ministry of Defense called for the U.S. government to rely on the evolutionary development of technologies for data collection and analysis.

Aftermath

On October 30, the Special Group stopped the sabotage component of Operation Mongoose and later the Special Group was abolished. However, secret action against Cuba continued. The ExComm was renamed the Standing Group and reduced in size to five members at the fall of 1962. The members of the Standing Group included McCone, McNamara, Sorensen, Bundy, and Robert Kennedy.

The possibility of real nuclear war saw Soviets relent on their missile construction efforts –On November 20, 1962, the Soviets took a step to remove the remove II-28 bombers, the tactical nuclear weapons, and their six nuclear bombs. Castro was infuriated by this withdrawal act because he had wanted to keep the tactical weapons in Cuba. In addition, Khrushchev’s decision to withdraw the missiles came as a surprise to Castro –he was neither consulted nor informed about it. The news about the withdrawal of the missiles reached him through a radio broadcast.

To authenticate the withdrawal exercise, CIA published a memorandum on November 29 to verify that the total number of missiles that had been deployed to Cuba was actually withdrawn. After the verification exercise, the CIA confirmed that the Soviets had actually done as was expected –withdrawn all of the offensive weapons (42 missiles). The CIA’s report also indicated that the Soviets were ready to withdraw the IL-28 bombers, which had been delivered prior to the quarantine.

During the crisis, Soviets had amassed other several weapons systems in Cuba such as coastal defense missiles, flight aircraft, SAMs, and Komar missile boats. These elements, including the equipment for four armored combat group, remained in Cuba. Nuclear warheads were not seen in Cuba until the aerial photographs taken during the crisis period were reviewed in the post-crisis. The photographs taken from October 14 indicated that there was a nuclear warhead processing facility at the western end of the runway at the Mariel Naval Airfield. On October 23, one of the warhead vans at the San Cristobal MRBM launch site had its rails extended and it seemed to be transferring a warhead to a truck that had parallel rails in its beds. Furthermore, the post-crisis analysis of photography indicated that the Soviets had fueled and mated the warheads and had practiced transferring the missiles to the erectors.

Other views hold that the compromise was a sharp embarrassment for Khrushchev and the Soviets due the fact that United States’ withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy was donesecretly –not made public. For Cuba, the withdrawal was perceived as a betrayal by the Soviets –the decision to withdraw the missiles was made without the knowledge of Castro.

On the side of the U.S., there were some (such as General LeMay) who felt that the compromises made by Kennedy’s administration implied greatest defeat in the history of America.

The positive aspect of the crisis is that it necessitated the formation of Hotline Agreement, which was a direct communications link between Washington, D.C. and Moscow (the infamous Moscow-Washington hotline). This was crafted with the aim of facilitatinguninterrupted communication between the administration officials of Soviets and U.S.

However, critics such as Seymour Hersh and Seymour Mellman held the opinion that the Cuban missile crisis fueled U.S. use of military means in countries like Vietnam.

Lessons learned from the U.S. as a result of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 , defined a new direction for American foreign policy in the world.

First, the U.S. continued to upgrade military- political doctrines to

raise the threshold of a possible US-Soviet nuclear conflict , reduce the risk of unintentional collision and outgrow conventional regional conflict involving the great powers in a nuclear war . American experts had proposed the concept of “mutual assured destruction” that develops within

strategy of “flexible response .” In 1968, the U.S. strategy of “flexible response” was the basis for the fourth NATO strategic concept , dubbed ” strategic concept defense of the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ,” which showed greater cohesion in the alliance allies around the United States . Second, the U.S. and the Soviet Union intensified negotiations on arms control , in particular , the limitations of missile defense and strategic offensive arms .

Third, steps were taken to increase the technical capacity to

conduct direct dialogue USSR and the U.S. in an emergency. June 20, 1963 between Moscow and Washington was established line ” hot link “, which is round the clock work mode allowed the leaders of both nations to communicate with each other. Thus were laid the foundations of the US- Soviet rapprochement , which continues with a few adjustments and now .RESPONSES/REACTIONs FROM THE CIZENS

It is almost five decades since the occurrence of the infamous Cuban missile crisis. The events that unfolded in the fall of 162 have attracted many researchers, who have focused on the analysis of how Cuba, a small island nation, became the focal point of the Cold War. One of the most researched and written about events in the Cold War is the Cuban missile crisis. Prominent researchers have taken this course to give the political view and possible consequences of this infamous event. Various authors and experts have compiled extensive amounts of information from a number of different written sources and interviews. Nonetheless, there are no classified sources of information about how the public reacted after the announcement of the Cuban Missile Crisis by President Kennedy – as most of the information was always restricted to the Oval Office. Despite such inadequacy, the role playedby the individuals, rather than national governmentcannot be taken for granted. Some quantitative researches conducted among the U.S. population show that people reacted differently but with caution. A study by Jiri Nehnevajsa showed that significant number of Americans got involved in crisis related activities after the news about the Cuban missile crisis went on air (Mast 1966). The research was particularly conducted in post-crisis period, that is, 1963. The research questions were about whether the sample Americans got involved in any crisis related activities during the Cuban Crisis. The activities comprised efforts to respond to the threat posed by the crisis in a cautionary way, including calling the Civil Defense office, building shelter for their families, leaving their homes, purchasing food and drugs, discussion and provisions.

There are interesting points that were shown by the research. It revealed that the relative size of the geographical unit where respondents lived had a significant effect on the extent of their overall response to the crisis. On the one hand, those who lived in metropolitan areas showed higher levels of engagement in the crisis related activities. On the other hand, those who lived in smaller towns showed lowest rate of engagement in crisis related activities. In addition, respondents that engaged in crisis activity met the following classifications: were better educated, tended to earn more money, thought of themselves as middle class, they were often married, and younger in age. They maintained remarkable level of optimism, showed the a great sense of need for perotection. These respondents seemed to be less oriented to collectivity-centered efforts, and instead preferred to rely on their families and themselves. This signifies that family structure played a significant role toward the easing of the crisis. The negotiations that were going on between the leaders of the states that were involved in the crisis required sound social platform, which was provided by the rational discussions within families. The research revealed that the most common activity in which the respondents averagely scored higher was the discussions within the families (30% of the respondents). The rest of the activities scored relatively lower: making provisions (15%), building of shelter (14%), increased food-drugs purchase, calling Civil Defense office, and moving to safer location averagely scored 5%.

The theoretical perspective about the results of the research is that the modal individual who engaged in the crisis related actions appeared to be more like the middle class type, who seemed to be oriented toward and related wellto their society. Similarly, a report by Stephen Whitney produced in 1961, showed that 6% of sample size of 1,474 adults had built shelters (Mast 1966). The relevance of this finding to this paper is the attributes of those respondents who built the shelters. These people were different from most of the general populace –they tended to be better educated, had higher incomes, and had value perspectives that set them apart somehow from the national averages. They somewhat discredited the notion of rebellion and regarded it as immature idea. They welcomed the idea of rationalism in trial times like during the crisis.

The implication of Whitney’s conclusion is that shelter builders were responsible individuals, who were somewhat conservative, intolerant of deviance, not driven by compulsion, and took value opinions of the society earnestly.

Teachings from the Cuban Missile Predicament

The principal rough drafts of the past are almost always unreliable

For one to draw lessons from history, it is important to wait until full story is acquired. With this regard, the journalistic accounts written in October 1962 only captured a small fraction of what was happening within the Kennedy administration and fundamentally ignored the Russian and Cuban perspectives. A few years after the crisis ended, the early journalistic accounts were supplemented by memoirs written by the key participants such Robert F. Kennedy’s subsequent account, “Thirteen Days”-that was initially released in 1969. The Kennedy family and their direct aides immeasurablyswayed almost the complete early versions of the crisis, and thus told the story from their point of view.

Significant delay was witnessed in providing the evidence about the crisis. Detailed documentary evidence began to be available to scholars at the fall of 1980s when the National Security Archive in Washington won a landmark court battle for the access to the records of the State Department historian. The was even much delay on the Soviet and Cuban accounts of the disaster. They arose in 1990s succeeding the downfall of communism in the Soviet Union besidesthe momentous consultations in Havana in 1992 and 2002.Preposterously, official Soviet and Cuban records are largely inaccessible to western historians even today. Despite three years of freedom of Information Act appeals, there is still no perfect piece of info about the unintended October 27, 1962, over flight of the Soviet Far East by Captain Charles Maultsby (an event that Khrushchev to President Kennedy could push them to real war).

Presidential decision making calls for unusual steps in any regime, instead of the allegedsystematizedsteps

In the hopeof claimingrecognition for Khrushchev’s abrupt about-face on the dawn of Sunday, October 28, the Kennedy family aides coined the concept of the “Trollope ploy” to define the U.S. diplomatic policy on Black Saturday. Actually, Robert Kennedy created this notion and he proposed that President Kennedy had better ignore Khrushchev’s appeal on Saturday daybreak for a Turkey-Cuba rocketswitch and instead accept his ambiguously worded offer to dismantle the missile sites in return for a U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba.

However, a rewrite reply to Khrushchev focused more on the conciliatory-sounding aspects of the first letter. In addition, the reply was done and reviewed by many authors. Even though President Kennedy ignored the second Khrushchev letter, he ordered Robert, his brother, to tell Dobrynin that the U.S. would pull out its artilleries from Turkey. Moreover, he began setting the diplomatic foundation for anopen Turkey-Cuba switch. Straightforwardly, the “Trollope ploy” account of history pronouncesbetterrationality and logic to the edgyExComm debate of Saturday early afternoonthan anyonesensed at thatstage.

The view from the Oval Office is very limited

The president of the United States may be the best-informed and most powerful person in the world. But there is still much that he may not know about the true security situation. In light of this fact, President Kennedy did not know numerous thingsduring the missile crisis of October 1962.Principally, the Defense Secretary Robert McNamara articulatedto President Kennedy on 20th October that there were between 6,000 and 8,000 Soviet technicians on Cuba. On the contrary, there were 43,000 Soviet troops on Cuba, including heavily armed combat troops. Second, President Kennedy was not aware that the Soviet defenders possessed 98 tactical nuclear warheads, with capability of wiping out U.S. beachheads in addition to the Guantanamo Naval Base. Russian soldiers had relocatednuclear-powered cruise missiles up to 15 miles close to the naval base at the height of the crisis. Declassified U.S. intelligence reports also confirm the movement of unidentified artillery equipment. Third, President Kennedy believed that an intervention was forthcoming at a period when the vessels were in excess of 500 miles apart. He was deluded about a potential clash amongst the U.S. Navy in addition to Soviet missile-carrying freighters. That was on October 24. Additionally McNamaraarticulated to President Kennedy that a 37 mm antiaircraft explosive had hit a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane on the afternoon of October 27, and that the plane was not damaged. On the contrary, a U-2 had been brought down in Cuba by a Russian surface-to-air rocket early on the October 27th.

The conclusion of the past can change over time

The immediate aftermath of the crisis gave the perception that Kennedy was the big winner because he had achieved his basic objective of removing Soviet missiles from Cuba. It also gave a view of Castro as the biggest loser because Khrushchev decision to withdraw the missiles only reached him through the radio at his chagrin. On the contrary, Castro can be viewed as the biggest winner because despite the America’s efforts to overthrow his government and subdue the communist system that was spreading in Cuba, he emerged stronger after the crisis and ruled for more than four decades. In addition, Kennedy was assassinated by a Fair Play for Cuba Committee activist despite having triumphed in the foreign policy.

The victory on missile crisis, which had gone the way of the U.S. culminated in unintended consequences. One such result was the intensification in the Cold War weaponriescompetition as Soviet leaders pursued to expunge the recollection of the Cuban humiliation. It is noted that the Soviet assistant foreign minister, VasilyKuznetsov, ushered a threat to a senior U.S. official,not long after the withdrawal of the Soviets’ missiles from Cuba.The leaders who succeeded Khrushchev embarked on a massive intercontinental ballistic program to achieve military parity with the U.S. However, as a result of huge expenses in military budgets, Soviet finally went bankrupt and the communism system became unpopular.

Containment worked

The missile crisis marked a pivotal point in the argument about whether a nuclear war could be overcome. Earlier, before October 1962, a prominent group of generals led by Curtis LeMay had preferred a first strike against the Soviet Union. But after the crisis, a different perspective emerged among such generals –they realized that it was not possible to kill all the communists without harming millions of Americans.

Character counts

Finally, the crisis demonstrates the rare pivotal role of personality in politics. It suffices to mention that had someone else been president in October 1962, then the crisis could have culminated in real and ruinous war. President Kennedy himself embraced the role played by the senior advisors who took part in the ExComm debates –he noted that all were “energetic and bright”. However, Kennedy held a contrary opinion that if any member of the team were president, then the world would have been probably rushed into a disastrous war.His view borrowed from the fact that many of the dozen senior advisors who took part in the ExComm debate had favored bombing the missile sites on Cuba, a step which could have been perilous. Therefore, due to the possibility of occurrence of catastrophic war had things been handled otherwise, it is worth giving credit to President Kennedy for his decision to resort to a blockade of Cuba (Quarantine) rather than waging an air strike. He is surely not to blame for not taking the risk of exasperating the Russians to take a clumsy retaliatory response.

Conclusion

Over the past five decades, the United States has experienced several major foreign policy crises. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is probably the one that most gripped the nation. This event was of enormous importance in the history of America and the world beyond the American boundaries. It posed a clear and present danger to the nation, galvanized the populace, and compelled the political leadership into forceful and decided action. Even though the crisis affected the nation, the public was neither terrorized nor paralyzed. The U.S. people maintained political and psychological resilience in the face of this confrontation. They absorbed the shock, supported their leaders, and continued with their lives. It indicated the symbol of the U.S. society in times of great trials.

The Cuban missile disaster has been studied and analyzed from the perspective of crisis management and presidential power. However, interviews with U.S. and Soviet participants and new archival discoveries show that the implication of the crisis is the haphazard returns of the crisis management and limits of presidential power. It is in record that both Khrushchev and Kennedy did not want war in October 1962 because both of them had first-hand witness of the destruction and loss of life during World War II.

The major drama at the height of the missile crisis was not whether Khrushchev and Kennedy wanted to control events that were unfolding; it was whether they could. Both leaders had played a role in increasing the tension that existed between the two nations. Kennedy had authorized the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and the Operation Mongoose. These two events made the Soviet believe that Kennedy’s administration was determined to get rid of Castro once and for all. In an attempt to protect his Caribbean ally, Khrushchev made the hasty decision to deploy nuclear missiles nearly ten thousand miles from Soviet shores, near America’s boundary. Therefore, the two were struggling to contain the specter of nuclear destruction that they themselves had initiated.

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